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THE MORALITY OF REGULATION
LOREN A. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION

The Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution' is designed to deal with a moral problem inherent in
democratic government, namely: How does a democratic society prevent
majority factions from using their political power to redistribute wealth
from a minority to the majority, or some part of the majority?
Constitutional restrictions on direct national taxation, federalism,
separation of powers, the Due Process Clause, and the procedural liberties
and political structure in the Constitution and Bill of Rights were directed
to preventing this danger. These protections, however, still leave gaps
through which majorities can despoil minorities of their wealth. The
Taking Clause, like the recognition of the ancient writ of habeas corpus,
functions as a plug to some of these gaps. Thus, even when government
has passed through all the procedural hoops in depriving persons of liberty
or property, there is still a substantive final defense.
Constitutional or limited government has, at its core, the moral
norm that government power is limited in the degree to which, and the
manner in which, it may restrict the lives, liberties or property of its
citizens. Thus, whenever government promulgates any regulation affecting
citizens, a legitimate question exists as to whether that regulation
improperly intrudes on the rights of the regulated.
This is a deeply moral question, because it goes to the autonomy of
the human person. A person's body, the governmental restrictions on the
activity of that body, and the property owned and utilized by that body are
all integral parts of the individual's personhood. Only if one believes that
human beings are not moral entities can one say that regulation that affects
persons is not a moral issue. Human rights questions are always moral
questions. Regulation that affects persons always poses moral questions.
By regulation that affects persons, I mean any regulation that restricts a
person's rights to life, to the exercise of liberty or to the use of property.

Chief Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
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For much of this century, this view has been neither popular nor
much argued in the public forum. Far more often, the case for property
rights and economic liberty has been made on expediential and empirical
grounds, juxtaposed against moral and emotional arguments for the
restriction and limitation of property rights and economic liberties. In part
this can be explained by the collectivist intellectual currents of the first
half of the 20' century, with the rise of the "ugly siblings" of fascism and
socialism. The idea must be understood in terms of the intellectual failure
of classical liberalism in the later 19' century, however, to appreciate
Adam Smith as a moral philosopher.
There is a significant rhetorical advantage to showing that the
regulations one opposes do the exact opposite of what their proponents
claim. This form of argument avoids deep philosophical conflicts that, in
the short run, most often can not be resolved rationally. Of course, for
most purposes there is no harm in using this "law and economics"
approach in analyzing regulatory activity. Additionally, social cohesion
and political stability in a society are furthered by having as few moral and
philosophical conflicts as possible, because these types of conflict make
democratic accommodation and compromise difficult. If the history of the
twentieth century has taught us anything, this should be axiomatic.
There are, however, two principal dangers produced by couching
the entire case for economic liberty and property rights on a foundation of
efficiency, empirical success, and pragmatic utility. The first danger is
that the public will lose an understanding of the real basis for the free
society: the morality of human dignity. It is not because property rights
and economic liberty produce the most prosperous and egalitarian society,
which of course they do, that they are justified. The real justification for
property rights and economic liberty is that it is impossible to have a
moral society without them, and the justification's corollary is that every
action which restricts liberty or property raises a moral question. Of
course, such restrictions may be morally justified in a number of
circumstances. The inquiry into this justification, however, remains an
inherently moral one. It also should be noted that this inquiry is generally
not a judicial one. It is an inquiry committed to the political branches in
our constitutional system.
The second danger of the pragmatic defense of freedom is that it
creates an asymmetry which concedes to the opponents of economic
liberty and property rights not only the moral high ground, but the whole
moral case. This ultimately destroys the case for liberty, since the human
being is ultimately a moral animal. While positions acknowledged by the
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public at the time to be the moral position are not always so,2 they
generally have prevailed until they lost their moral credibility. Pragmatic
or empirical arguments tend to be effective at the margins, not in the
central battles.
There have been at least five historic lines of attack directed at
regulations that citizens believe to infringe on their rights. These lines of
attack may be characterized as the procedural remedy, the substantive due
process remedy, the statutory remedy, the political remedy, and the
constitutional remedy. I propose to analyze each of these avenues or
approaches with the goal of placing the regulatory taking avenue into the
context of the general moral dilemma of regulation in a free society. The
regulation of land has some particular characteristics that raise certain
additional questions not raised by the regulation of other kinds of property.
These will be explored in the context of the general problem.
I. THE PROCEDURAL REMEDY
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 and pre- and post-APA
judicial doctrine have long held that, with a few exceptions, certain
procedural steps must be met by the regulators before regulations can be
imposed on individuals. Two rationales underlie this requirement. The
primary rationale is that fairness or due process, combined with our
democratic ideal, demand that before something is done to persons they
have a chance to have their say about that action. At its most basic, it
involves the time-honored concept of "getting one's day in court."
Democracy has expanded that time-honored common law notion to
political as well as judicial decisions. Another way to characterize this
rationale is that each person is surrounded by a sphere of privacy or rights
characterized by the phrase "life, liberty, and property." This sphere may
not be entered but with the person's permission or by appropriate legal
process.
The second theory behind both procedural due process and its
structural embodiments in the APA and other statutes states that decisions
made with full consideration of all interests involved will be better
decisions than those made without such input. The idea that judges and
juries should hear both the plaintiff and the defendant before reaching a

2

As demonstrated by prohibition and the progressive income tax, for example.

' 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1996).
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decision is axiomatic in today's law. Fairness requires it, and most believe
that a better decision will generally result.
With respect to regulatory and administrative decision making, as
well as legislating, the proposition that good decisions require input from
all affected interests is not axiomatic. In legislating, the proposition is
generally not accepted because the Constitution, the courts and the
democratic process are thought to provide the safeguards externally to the
law-making process that are internalized in judicial proceedings by due
process. We judge the quality of a statute not by the quality of the
process, but by its merits or demerits. However, even in the legislative
process the growth of staff, support agencies, and the use of fact-finding
hearings has grown in order to provide more comprehensive information
for supposedly better decision-making.
In the areas of regulation and administrative decision-making, the
law has, over the five decades since the passage of the APA, been
struggling with the proper model for making regulatory and administrative
decisions. While the theoretical framework has by no means crystallized
into either the pure judicial or the pure political model of citizen
participation, it has moved strongly in the direction of the judicial model.4
The movement has been most pronounced in the area of regulations. But
even in the area of administrative decisions made by political appointees,
process restraints, analogous to due process, have become ever more
common. While I have criticized the trend toward over-judicialization of
the administrative process, 5 candor requires me to note that the trend has
gone on unabated, and apparently, unaffected by my critique.
Thus, it has been recognized to a fairly great extent in the area of
regulatory, and many kinds of administrative decisions that affected
persons have a right to some type of process or hearing before imposition
of the regulation or the decision. This right, however, is of a more limited
type than that provided in the judicial model. This lower level of formal
process is typified by the fact that regulatory and administrative decisionmakers, unlike judges, are not supposed to be disinterested.
The procedural challenge is the most important current method of
challenging regulations. It keeps the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit quite busy, and is a fairly significant item
on other courts' dockets. In land use regulation it is the main route to
' See generally Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law,
1985 DUKE L.J. 427 (1985).
' See id.
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judicial scrutiny for the land owner opposing the regulation. In the case of
wetlands regulations, for example, a permit denial can be appealed as
arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Many regulatory taking cases
against the federal government start in the district courts through this
route.
A citizen-plaintiff must pass a high threshold to show that a federal
regulation is arbitrary and capricious. Great deference is given to the
regulatory agency under Chevron6 and by the judiciary generally. The
presumption of regularity, the presumption that government officials act
properly, and the acknowledged expertise of many agencies, all make an
APA challenge of a regulation daunting. To the extent that the arbitrary
and capricious standard embodies both procedural and substantive
elements, absent a showing of significant procedural mistakes by the
regulators, it is very hard to bring a successful challenge based upon the
substance of the regulation.
The dramatic growth of regulatory litigation since the passage of
the APA has had a number of collateral effects. It has placed some
substantive constraints on many areas of regulation. It has also made
regulating slower and more costly. It has, in addition, judicialized the
The result of this has been both to allow
procedure for regulating.
broader input into the regulatory process and to make that process more
rigid, and therefore less responsive to real world changes.
Correspondingly, the procedural quality of agency action improved but
became more rigid, more formalized and less responsive.
However, while the procedural challenges to regulatory
impositions available to the citizen under the APA and other statutes
provide some protection from regulation that is either wildly imprudent,
based on demonstrably false information, or done without adequate
consideration, they do not protect the citizen very well against the kind of
factional despoilment feared by the Framers of the Constitution. The APA
does give minorities time and tools to make their case, and this is an
important protection against temporary passions and fads of the regulatory
majority.

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(applying the doctrine that the judiciary must uphold agency action based on any
permissible construction of the statute unless the agency action contradicts the specific
intent of Congress).
6
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THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS REMEDY

Prior to the late 1930s, courts used the concept of substantive due
process to scrutinize the validity of governmental actions affecting the
fundamental rights of individuals. It has often been claimed that this era
came to an end in 1937,' in favor of a much more limited standard of
judicial review. This new standard purportedly gave much greater
deference to legislative determinations. This characterization appears to
me to obscure what really happened in the late 1930s. Per the now famous
footnote in Carolene Products,' the courts really limited substantive due
process review to non-economic challenges. This reflected, as I have
expressed elsewhere,9 the judicial Zeitgeist of that era.
The period between the 1920s and the 1970s was marked by the
intellectual ascendancy of collectivism around the world. In America we
suffered only a mild form of the illness. In our version of the collectivist
illusion we lost our historic understanding of the role of property rights
and economic liberties as an integral part of the fundamental rights and
integrity of the human person. Faced with an increasingly collectivist
conception of social organization, courts increasingly deferred to the
political branches when property rights were an issue.
Recognition that freedom and property rights are merely different
aspects of the same thing, and that the denial of one necessarily produces
the denial of the other, has grown dramatically in the last decade. The
courts, however, are still searching for a proper conceptual framework for
reviewing challenges to regulations based upon property rights.
Substantive due process-one method often promoted as a solution-is
not likely to provide such a conceptual framework. Its essential theory
provides no reasonably objective criteria for distinguishing between what
governmental actions affecting fundamental rights are permissible and
which ones are not. The core theory of substantive due process is that
certain things cannot be done, even with due process. This theory is
subject to a destructive subjectivity that leads to the rule of judges rather
than the rule of law.

See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (noting
the need for a higher level of judicial scrutiny for due process challenges that were not
economically-based, i.e., race).
See generally Loren A. Smith, Life, Liberty, and Whose Property?. An Essay on
Property Rights, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1996).
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Substantive due process is, in reality, a simplistic version of natural
law theory, but without most of the historic elements of that discipline,
and without natural law's strong emphasis on duty and the human being's
moral obligations. The philosophical foundations of natural law theory
can be found in the Judaeo-Christian understanding of human nature,
which gives the theory its coherence. Substantive due process analysis has
none of this rigor. At another place I have written on the doctrine's
history, ° and attempted to explain the limited future utility of that
doctrine.
An analysis of natural law theory far exceeds the scope of this
article; however, it is important not to tar natural law theory with the very
real failings of substantive due process. It should also be remembered that
while substantive due process is a doctrine crafted for a limited judicial
purpose, natural law is a comprehensive theory of the state, more relevant
as a decisional guide to the executive and to the legislature than to the
judiciary.
Thus, while the protection of liberty and property is the prime
objective of our legal system, the use of substantive due process is
unlikely to provide a useful tool to the judiciary for this purpose. To
complement the new understanding of the importance of economic liberty
and property rights to human freedom, a new, or at least different, set of
conceptual tools is needed.
III. THE STATUTORY REMEDY
Inherent in the federal system of regulation is the theory of
enumerated powers. Congress may only legislate under certain identified
powers. Although an expansive reading of the commerce clause has de
facto created a government of general rather than delegated powers, the
theory has never been rejected and may yet have some vitality."
Agencies, however, are still limited by the grants of statutory authority
they receive from the Congress. They may only promulgate regulations or
issue administrative decisions as authorized by statute.

'o See generally Loren A. Smith, Business, Buck$ & Bull: The Corporation, The First
Amendment and The Corrupt PracticesLaw, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1978).
" See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its

Commerce Clause authority in passing legislation that forbade possession of firearms
within designated school areas).
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IV. THE POLITICAL REMEDY
Publius put forward in the Federalist Papers2 the notion that
under the new constitution the political structure of the government would
be the primary guarantee of liberty and property rights. 3 The judiciary
and the provisions of the Constitution and Bill of Rights restricting
government powers were important, but thought to be a secondary or
backup protection. For several reasons, I do not intend in this essay to
engage in the debate over whether the political structure was more
important than the "paper barriers" supported by the judiciary in the
protection of our liberties: first, because the question cannot really be
answered; second, because the body of literature and the historic length of
the debate make trivial any contribution this small article could make;
finally, that debate is not our purpose in this article or symposium.
However, the topic does have great relevance to the protection of rights
against certain types of regulation, particularly the regulation of land.
The democratic process, as embodied in our Constitution and
national government, was designed with the danger of factions, including
majority factions, clearly in mind, as Madison noted in Federalist No.
10. " The differing political constituencies, combined with the federal
system's emphasis on dual sovereignty, tend to limit radical departures
from established regulatory norms of any period. This is because many
group vetoes must be overcome in order to get regulation-authorizing
legislation through the system from subcommittee through presidential
signature. This inhibition on regulation generally protects those minorities
capable of placing at least minimal pressure on one part of our complex
law-making system.
There are four limitations of the political remedy's protection from
improper regulations. First, it does not protect insular or very discrete
minorities, or individuals who are either unpopular or so lacking in
political clout that they cannot meet the minimal threshold for influencing
the legislative or executive decision.
A second problem is that the political process, particularly at the
national level, tends to discount individualized cases in favor of broad
distinctions that can garner legislative majorities. Thus, small or particular
regulatory abuses are not easy to remedy through the political process in a
12
"
'

See generally

THE FEDERALIST.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 123 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987).
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large democracy. Even when these abuses do affect a broad constituency,
the constituency might have little political significance if it is relatively
incoherent, compared with well-organized groups with a high level of
commitment to the particular regulation or regulatory scheme.
In a small democracy, like a town, regulatory abuses may be more
easily remedied. In those contexts, however, other factors come into play.
Personalities, social tensions, limited governmental budgets, and popular
prejudices may make it difficult for the politically unpopular to get any
fair hearing before a city council or town meeting. These factors often
have a great impact on the regulation of land. Very few of us can resist
the appeal of imposing a regulatory restriction on a neighbor's property if
it will make our property more enjoyable or valuable. When we can do
this in the name of health or the environment, so much the better. We then
get a feeling of moral uplift in addition to an economic benefit, at our
neighbor's expense! At the local level, this motivation can have a
substantial effect.
A third problem with the political remedy is that it has a bias
towards the status quo. This may protect against regulatory excess when
there is relatively little regulation. In systems of ongoing regulation, our
political system's bias tends to immunize the regulators from legislative
change or control. It creates a situation where the correction of regulatory
abuse is politically difficult and slow. This, in part, was one of the
concerns that motivated the Congress to pass many legislative veto
statutes in the thirty years prior to Chadha.5I
The fourth problem with the political remedy is that it treads a
tricky line between policy and potential corruption. To the extent that
political lobbying is used to change regulatory or legislative policy, the
basic tenets of democracy are reinforced. It is both appropriate and
respectable conduct. It is conduct, in fact, protected by the very core of
the First Amendment. However, as the problems sought to be dealt with
become ever more specific, the effect of an often-used political remedy is
to turn the regulatory system into a tool for extortion and a place where
unequal treatment of the law is the norm. The last fifty years have
provided abundant evidence of the tricky nature of political attempts to
deal with regulatory abuses.

"5See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding the
legislative veto unconstitutional).
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V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY

In the United States, the ultimate remedy for any government
action seen as an infringement on "God-given" liberties is a constitutional
challenge before some court. As far back as the early part of the 19'
century, Alexis de Tocqueville 6 noted this uniquely American trait, and
deemed it a positive part of our culture. The perpetual struggle in this
country between freedom and order has for the most part been fought in
the courtroom rather than at the barricades.
With respect to regulation, the battle was fought beginning in the
1930s along a number of fronts: the Commerce Clause, the Tenth
Amendment, the taxing power, the spending power, the nondelegation
doctrine, the Contract Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
property protections of the Fifth Amendment. When the 1960s dawned,
the federal judiciary had abandoned all protection of economic liberties
and property rights, except for a limited scrutiny based upon the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The only exception to this was the degree
to which state burdens on interstate commerce also affected the economic
liberties of individuals or businesses. These burdens received some
judicial scrutiny as well.
In the last two decades, the federal courts have heard and decided
more taking cases, particularly regulatory taking cases, than in any of the
previous decades since the dawn of the republic. This has occurred for two
related reasons. First, the federal government has, in the last few decades,
dramatically increased its level of regulatory control over the citizenry and
the economy. This has been particularly true with respect to the
environment and natural resources. While federal substantive land
regulation was generally quite limited before the 1970s, and water
regulation limited largely to navigational issues, that has also dramatically
changed.
Second, the taking remedy seemingly has become the only
judicially-recognized avenue open to those claiming that the federal
government has infringed economic liberties or property rights. Thus,
complainants who formerly may have found a conceptual framework in
the limits imposed upon the federal government by the Commerce Clause
or the Tenth Amendment or the nondelegation doctrine, now look to the
6 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON DEMOCRACY, REVOLUTION, AND SOCIETY,

SELECTED WRITINGS (John Stone and Stephen Mennell, eds., University of Chicago
Press 1980) (1835).
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Taking Clause as the only viable way to challenge an infringement of their
fundamental rights.
I have bemoaned this phenomenon in other places, 7 and bemoan it
again here. I believe that economic liberty and political liberty are neither
separable nor fundamentally distinguishable. Most human actions, such as
the publishing of a newspaper, for example, manifest both economic and
political liberty. Making the Taking Clause do the work of all of the
constitutional provisions designed to protect liberty and property,
however, does violence to the Framers' intent, as well as to the structure of
the Constitution. To some extent, however, it explains the growth of
taking litigation against the federal government, when combined with the
growth of federal function and regulatory impact.
Thus, to return to my opening premises, I hope that the context in
which taking litigation occurs can now be appreciated. The Constitution
imposes several mandates on the governmental system: governmental
authority must be limited; it must be used fairly; and it must be reviewable
by an independent authority through a rational process. The Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment increasingly has become a method of
doing just these things, when the substantive effect of federal regulation
on private rights is at issue. The vast majority of legal regulatory
challenge is still procedural, or formally procedural. And most of the
battle over regulation still occurs in the political forum, legislative halls
and executive conference rooms.
However, we hear more about
regulatory taking claims because they are the only currently viable means
of challenging governmental economic actions or policies that seriously
impact property rights.
Taking cases historically have come in two basic flavors. One
involves governmental actions that physically appropriate, or take
property. The other involves regulatory actions that have the effect of
destroying the value of property. The trend in the courts is toward an
increase in regulatory taking cases. These cases also have generated
virtually all the current interest in taking law. The physical taking cases
generally are not controversial, are heavily fact bound, and most often turn
on complex issues of causation. They involve relatively few issues of law.
They are very close to tort cases, with a few exceptions. Their biggest
issue is whether the government produced the effect the plaintiffs say it
did. Often, government-caused pollution or permanent flooding is the
gravamen of the complaint.
"7See generally SMITH, supra note 4 at 429; note 9 at 1055.

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 22:507

Regulatory taking cases, on the other hand, often involve the most
profound issues of the rights of property owners and the limits on
legitimate government powers. While regulatory taking cases may also
have complex fact questions, they are of interest beyond the litigants
because they raise fundamental concerns about the nature of liberty and
government. They are moral challenges dealing with the claimed rights of
individuals or groups. Whether the individuals or groups actually have
those rights, the challenge must be taken very seriously.
VI. THE REGULATION OF LAND
Land always has raised unique problems and issues for the law, not
only because it was the basis of virtually all social wealth, but because it
was the primary basis for political rights in the common law tradition. At
common law, the ownership of land, and the kind of ownership,
determined one's status, i.e., whether one was free or indentured. In early
America, land ownership became almost synonymous with the meaning of
liberty. The independent rural land owner was the model and ideal of
Jeffersonian democracy. The landowner was seen as the ideal citizen, in
contrast to an urban proletariat.
This heavy cultural baggage is supported by other functional
characteristics that make land ownership and its regulation a unique
problem. First, the law considers each parcel of land unique. Unlike
money, or most personal property, it is not fungible. Its location can never
be exactly duplicated, and each location has a unique value. Second, the
owner of land rarely has the same degree of liquidity as the owner of
personal property such as stocks, bonds, gold, or the like. If someone does
something I object to near my land, I generally have to deal with that
action, rather than shift my assets. Third, people have deep emotional
attachments to land that they rarely have towards the other common types
of wealth. Fourth, a piece of land is part of a community, always
connected to other land, and existing in a matrix of roads, rivers, and the
whole of civilized society.
These unique land characteristics lead, not surprisingly, to unique
problems concerning the regulation of land. Most problems occur in the
context of the local regulation of land by zoning and planning. Analysis
of land regulation is beyond the scope of this essay. However, one general
consideration raised by local land regulation also concerns our central
issue: the moral problem of regulation by the federal government, or
exaction.
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Landowners, because they are dependent on a community, and
because they cannot move their property, are particularly sensitive to
regulatory burdens. They generally cannot pass on the cost of such
regulation to others in the market, as business generally can with health
and safety regulation. If we think drivers must have safety belts, and make
the auto manufacturers install them, they can generally pass on the cost to
the purchaser. If we think a land owner's property should remain
undeveloped, then the landowner must absorb the full cost of that decision
(absent a government payment). In fact, in the case of such a decision, the
other property owners may actually derive a benefit from the regulation,
while the regulated owner suffers the full loss.
This phenomenon is complicated further by the legal uniqueness of
each parcel of land, which allows government to regulate each parcel
differently. The potential for unequal treatment of very similar parcels
removes much democratic protection. When the people vote a tax that
applies to all, they are quite sensitive to its reasonableness. When they
vote a tax that applies only to others, all those who are not saints apply a
very different standard. Thus, the regulation of land has unique dangers
for minorities, even in the most democratic of majoritarian systems.
VII. CONCLUSION

In this essay I have attempted to sketch the moral issue at the core
of every exercise of regulatory authority over land ownership. I have
attempted to show how that authority may be reviewed in the current
American federal context, and the role the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment has in such review. I have also shared a few insights as to
why land regulation presents some unique problems for our legal and
constitutional system. My conclusion, implicit in this whole article, is that
regulation and its review cannot be separated from the profoundly moral
question of the fundamental rights of the person in a free society. This
moral question requires as much sophistication and consideration when
land is at issue as when speech or reproductive questions are at stake. For
some decades, unfortunately, the legal system has not given such
consideration to the regulation of property rights or economic liberty. I
believe that era is ending.

